



HUNGARIAN-POLISH

FREEDOM INSTITUTE

"Both are valiant, both are brave,
Blessings on them both we crave."



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**POWER GAINED THROUGH DECEIT:
HOW GLOBALISTS CONCEAL THEIR TRUE AGENDA
FROM SOCIETY**

THE CASE OF POLAND



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Executive Summary

Before 2023, Poland experienced events very similar to those we are seeing in Hungary in the run-up to the 2026 elections. At that time, a huge international and Polish left-wing globalist coalition helped Donald Tusk to oust the conservative, right-wing, sovereignist government led by Law and Justice from power. Tusk was supported by exactly the same people who are now behind Péter Magyar, so once he seized power, he began to fulfill his promises not to the Polish people, but to the globalist elite in Brussels. Péter Magyar sees this government as a model, and since the same people exert influence over him, if he wins, he will only be able to follow the same path set out by Manfred Weber and his colleagues, just like the Polish cabinet, which, as this year's presidential election shows, has caused serious disappointment among the Polish people. An excellent example of this is the draft "Tisza tax," which would introduce a brutal increase in the tax burden by the Tisza Party.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, took part in the campaign against PiS, publicly bidding farewell to Donald Tusk in the summer of 2022 with these words: *"Good luck, Donald, next time we meet, it will be as prime minister."* Manfred Weber also took part, standing by Tusk just as openly as he did Péter Magyar a year later. Volodymyr Zelensky also took part in this campaign, despite the fact that Mateusz Morawiecki's government had provided his country with enormous financial, political, and military assistance for a year and a half. Zelensky "repaid" all this by harshly criticizing the right-wing prime minister in the final stages of the campaign. The similarity is therefore striking, as the Ukrainian president also interfered in Hungarian domestic politics, and it is well known that a lot of available information indicates that the Ukrainian secret service also supported the Tisza Party. Of course, the international left-wing globalist financial players linked to George Soros, who tried to influence the outcome of the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections from outside, and the media outlets linked to the Open Society network, and other organizations linked to the Open Society Network are now clearly supporting Péter Magyar.

Although Jarosław Kaczyński's party won the 2023 election with confidence, it failed to form a majority, and Tusk was able to cobble together a multi-party rainbow coalition. This heterogeneous alliance was held together by one thing: the rejection of PiS, which took the form of criticism for some and outright hatred for others. Lacking a real program or vision, Tusk deliberately fueled this hatred in his campaign. A year and a half after the government was formed, the Hungarian Polish Freedom Institute's latest report, we show how this alliance built on hatred came to power, what external and internal forces helped it, what became of the promises made to voters, and what price Poles are now paying for the puppet government imposed on them by Brussels.



A dysfunctional state, a crumbling healthcare system, a failing education system, late trains, in short: everything is bad – Péter Magyar's European People's Party colleague, Donald Tusk, repeated these familiar slogans to Hungarian readers during his year-and-a-half-long tour of the country, from the summer of 2022 until the fall 2023 elections. We are diverse, we will argue a lot, but we know one thing: this government must go, he said. The European political elite assisted him in this. Polish voters, like their Hungarian counterparts, were blackmailed with the threat that Warsaw would only receive its EU funds if they replaced the Polish right-wing government, which had built its policy on supporting families, strengthening Christian values, and representing the national interest.

As soon as the Tusk government came to power, it immediately began to repay the debt, which Polish voters are paying for. The sudden opening of the Brussels money taps does not bring the funds due to the people, but is taking place under scandalous circumstances for purposes that are causing no small scandal. The national debt has skyrocketed, even though the most important investments in the national interest have been put on hold. Gender propaganda has crept into schools, and the government is building migrant centers. Donald Tusk and his colleagues are repeatedly violating constitutional rules in order to extend their power as much as possible; they are persecuting not only their political opponents, but also ordinary citizens who stand up for their sovereignist convictions and Christian values, or who dare to criticize the left. Meanwhile, many of the promises made to voters have remained empty words. Not even a third of the "100 concrete promises" announced for the first hundred days have been fulfilled.

No wonder voters woke up and elected Karol Nawrocki, a sovereignist president who may be able to stop the government's rampage. But Poles, who paid a high price for believing in Tusk, who preached love but actually incited hatred, will have to wait another two and a half years for real change. Hungarians can learn all the more from the Polish example, which Péter Magyar has admitted he would like to copy. It is not the promises made to the people that would be fulfilled, but Ursula von der Leyen, Manfred Weber, and Volodymyr Zelensky who would be the first to cash in on their support. EU funds would dry up, and the austerity measures that were tried to be kept secret would come to pass.

1. European Blackmail Against Poland

The core objective pursued by the conservative government in Poland between 2015 and 2023 was the repair of inefficient and corrupt state and military governance structures, implementation of social reforms to address the exclusion of numerous communities—particularly from Eastern Poland and smaller towns—economic revitalization, and the protection of national identity. Reforms were urgently needed in the judiciary, which remained entangled in post-communist dependencies; children and families required protection from the aggressive advance of woke ideology; and the country needed



developmental reinforcement through infrastructure investments, including a comprehensive road and highway network and strategic projects such as the Central Communication Port (CPK), nuclear power plants, Via Carpatia, the navigability of the Oder River, construction of the Elbląg Canal, and the Norwegian gas pipeline. Social initiatives were also implemented to support families, most notably the "500+" and later "800+" benefit for every child. During the hybrid Belarusian-Russian aggression on the Polish-Belarusian border—marked by the orchestration of mass migrant flows—the government quickly constructed a barrier protecting the EU and NATO's eastern frontier. Long before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, efforts were already underway to rebuild Poland's armed forces after years of decline and underfunding.

Meanwhile, the globalist opposition from 2015 to 2023 mounted aggressive attacks against the United Right government, falsely accusing it of undermining the rule of law, authoritarianism, corruption, incompetence, and violations of human rights. Above all, they weaponized central EU institutions to attack the Polish government and obstruct its reform agenda.

For eight years, the opposition wielded the concept of "rule of law" as a political weapon, disregarding the fact that many of its accusations were ideologically driven and based on arbitrary interpretations. Characteristic of this approach were statements by Donald Tusk, such as during the 2023 campaign: "If someone is daily stripping people of their rights, daily raping the law, turning a parody of justice into a system, and calling his party Law and Justice—then we have no other choice but to chase Kaczyński out on October 15." These words, a blatant act of manipulation and stigmatization of a political opponent, proved to be a harbinger of the very tactics employed by Tusk's government following its assumption of power: violations of constitutional procedures during the seizure of public media¹, the prosecution service², and the courts; the abuse of prosecutorial powers to target the opposition³; and attacks on independent institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the National Broadcasting Council, the Supreme Court, and the National Council of the Judiciary. The accusations of lawlessness turned out to be a prelude to the systematic dismantling of the rule of law by those very accusers.

The conservative government's actions were met with fierce resistance from left-liberal circles, which feared the loss of influence over political, economic, social, and cultural life. Unable to regain power through merit, they resorted to lies, manipulation, propaganda, and coercion. Initially, the left-liberal establishment attacked using the so-called "street and abroad" strategy. However, when mobilization fatigue set in among their supporters, foreign

¹ <https://www.iwp.edu> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

² <https://www.iwp.edu> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³ <https://www.iwp.edu> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



institutions—particularly the European Commission (EC), European Parliament (EP), Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and, in part, the Biden administration—became the principal instruments for undermining Polish sovereignty.

Brussels has long opposed governments that prioritize national interests over compliance with EU directives. Poland faced persistent attacks between 2015 and 2023—just as Hungary continues to face them today—for implementing policies aligned with the will of the Hungarian people rather than the agenda of EPP leader Manfred Weber or the broader European establishment.

The increasingly overt involvement of foreign institutions working on behalf of globalist forces in Poland was a decisive factor that significantly influenced both the ability of the conservative government to govern between 2015 and 2023 and the subsequent rise to power of the left-liberal coalition. The primary actors were structures of the European Union—most notably the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU—as well as European political parties, which ceased to function as transnational platforms for cooperation and instead operated as instruments of political pressure and interference in the internal affairs of Member States.

A particularly symbolic manifestation of this phenomenon was the conduct of Manfred Weber, Chairman of the European People's Party (EPP)—the largest faction in the European Parliament. In August 2023, Weber openly declared that the goal of his political grouping was to remove Polish conservatives from power and replace them with “their man”—Donald Tusk. In an interview with *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, he stated bluntly: “We are the only force that can replace PiS in Poland”⁴ This declaration left no doubt: a key European politician had not only taken sides in Poland's domestic political conflict but had effectively defined regime change in Warsaw as a political project of his own party faction within the European Parliament. These words encapsulated the narrative and strategy employed by European institutions, particularly the European Commission, which increasingly aligned itself with a political struggle against one ideological current in Poland. Legislative tools—such as infringement procedures or rule of law debates—were thus transformed into instruments of political coercion.

Following Donald Tusk's victory, the "model export" strategy was extended to Hungary. In a speech at the EPP Congress in Valencia on 29 April 2025, Weber presented Péter Magyar as a symbol of a similar political shift: "Victor Orban will retire and Peter Magyar will be the new face of a strong and independent Hungary."⁵ In October 2024, he wrote on platform X

⁵ [EPP-Valencia-speech-Manfred-Weber-29042025.pdf](https://epp.valencia.speech-manfred-weber-29042025.pdf).



(formerly Twitter): "Hungarians deserve a strong voice in Europe. Prime Minister Orbán, you are the past; Peter Magyar and the TISZA friends are the future!"⁶

Weber clearly views Poland and Hungary as successive stages in the same scenario: using EU institutions—the European Parliament, the European Commission—and coordinated media support to replace conservative governments with EPP-loyal leaders. From the perspective of foreign influence analysis, this is not about promoting democratic values, but a calculated strategy of political engineering that undermines the sovereignty and equality of Member States. This strategy was consistently applied to Poland throughout the entire period of conservative rule.

On 30 July 2020, the EU Commissioner for Equality, Helena Dalli, announced the Commission's decision to reject funding applications from six Polish local governments under the "Town-Twinning" program. The justification cited the adoption of resolutions "contrary to EU values." These were local declarations passed by municipal and county councils in defense of marriage as a union between a man and a woman and support for pro-family policies—often labeled as resolutions "in defense of the family" or "against LGBT ideology." Not one of these resolutions used the term "LGBT-free zone"—a false label later propagated by international media to distort and discredit the legitimate positions of Polish local authorities.

Dalli explained the Commission's decision by stating: "EU values and fundamental rights must be respected by Member States and state authorities. This is why 6 town twinning applications involving Polish authorities that adopted 'LGBTI free zones' or 'family rights' resolutions were rejected."⁷

In doing so, the European Commission applied de facto financial blackmail to Polish local governments, attempting to force policy change at the local level by threatening the loss of EU funds. This practice was widely criticized as violating the principle of subsidiarity, undermining the autonomy of local communities, and constituting political pressure without legal basis in the EU treaties.

The case of the fictitious "LGBT-free zones" became one of the most glaring examples of political coercion by the European Commission and the use of manipulative rhetoric. In reality, some municipal and county councils—primarily through initiatives by councillors affiliated with PiS—passed declarations opposing LGBT ideology and affirming the constitutional protection of the family as a union between a man and a woman. No Polish local government adopted a resolution establishing any kind of "LGBT-free zone." These actions were a response to the LGBT Declaration signed in 2019 by the Mayor of Warsaw,

⁶ <https://x.com/ManfredWeber/status/1843987507027034421> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁷ <https://x.com/helenadalli/status/1288122195927896068> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



which violated the constitutional rights of parents by committing to implement WHO's sexually explicit standards of sex education—including for very young children—and to finance LGBT programs. Some local governments reacted by adopting the aforementioned resolutions, which were then distorted and rebranded by political opponents as "LGBT-free zones." This false and harmful term was later adopted by EU institutions, despite having no basis in the actual content of the resolutions.

On 18 December 2019, the European Parliament passed a resolution expressing concern over these so-called "LGBT-free zones" and called on the European Commission to monitor EU funding allocations to these municipalities⁸. In June 2021, the Commission sent letters to the marshals of five Polish voivodeships, threatening to withhold approximately €150 million in EU funds unless the resolutions were repealed. Under this pressure, all five regions—despite the Commission's lack of legal competence in the matter—rescinded their declarations by the end of September 2021.

This case clearly illustrates the use of financial instruments as tools of political pressure and the exploitation of false narratives (such as "LGBT-free zones") to influence sovereign decisions made by democratically elected local authorities in a Member State of the European Union.

One of the most striking examples of aggressive rhetoric directed at Poland and Hungary was the statement made by European Parliament Vice-President Katarina Barley in an interview with *Deutschlandfunk* on 30 September 2020. She stated that "Länder wie Ungarn und Polen muss man finanziell aushungern" ("countries like Hungary and Poland must be financially starved"), referring to the idea of linking EU funding to assessments of adherence to the rule of law⁹. In Poland, these words sparked widespread outrage and were regarded as a manifestation of German political pressure and an attempt to impose political change through economic blackmail. Barley's statement became a symbol of the instrumental use of EU funds as a disciplinary tool against Member States that do not align ideologically with the European Commission.

A further example of the European Commission's unprecedented interference in Poland's domestic political life was the public statement by its President Ursula von der Leyen at the European People's Party (EPP) Congress in Rotterdam in early June 2022. During her speech, directly addressing Donald Tusk—then outgoing president of the EPP—von der Leyen said: "Now my dear Donald, you return to your home country to again stand up for those values. Bon courage my friend and Donald remember when we see each other again we'll see you as

⁸ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2019-0101_EN.html (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁹ <https://oko.press/niemka-chce-zaglodzic-polske-i-wegry> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



you've said as a Prime Minister."¹⁰ She later reiterated this in a post on platform X: "Great meeting with [@donaldtusk](#) at the [@EPP](#) congress in Rotterdam. Dear Donald, you embody our values. Now you return to your home country to stand up for them. Many thanks for your tireless work as EPP President."¹¹

This was a clear and unequivocal expression of support by the President of the European Commission for Donald Tusk's return to power in Poland. Such a statement not only violates the principle of institutional neutrality toward internal democratic processes in Member States, but also confirms that the highest levels of the European Commission were actively backing a specific political party in Poland, openly aligning themselves with one side of the political divide. This represents a serious threat to the sovereignty of democratic processes in Member States and stands in clear contradiction to the EU Treaties' requirement of impartiality from the Commission.

Equally revealing was the admission by EU Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders that financial coercion was being applied to Member States. In an interview with *Die Zeit* published on 1 October 2020 and titled "Money is always a very good means of pressure," Reynders explicitly confirmed that the European Union viewed EU funding as a tool of political leverage against Member States¹².

Asked whether effective instruments existed to counter what the newspaper referred to as the "erosion of the rule of law"—including financial instruments—Reynders responded that, as a former finance minister, he knows that money is always a very good means of pressure. He declared the obligation to ensure that European money is not only well spent in Member States, but also in accordance with the law. He further added that the publication of the first EU Rule of Law Report was intended to have concrete consequences for countries such as Poland and Hungary, where—in his opinion—the judiciary has already been deliberately politically infiltrated.

This statement leaves no doubt as to the actual intentions of the Commission: EU institutions openly declared their readiness to use financial pressure to force political and systemic change in Member States. Reynders' remarks clearly show that the European Commission no longer regarded its relationship with countries like Poland and Hungary as partnerships, but rather as mechanisms of control—where ideological loyalty was treated as a condition for access to EU funds. Such an approach undermines the principles of equality, solidarity, and national sovereignty enshrined in the EU's founding treaties.

¹⁰ <https://youtu.be> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

¹¹ <https://wpolityce.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

¹² <https://www.tysol.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



A further illustration of direct political pressure from EU institutions was the European Parliament debate held on 14 June 2023—just months before the Polish parliamentary elections¹³. Under the pretext of concern for the rule of law and citizens' rights, MEPs and representatives of the European Commission issued accusations against the Polish government, frequently based on false or distorted claims, clearly aimed at weakening its standing ahead of the decisive vote.

Particularly egregious were the attacks on amendments to the Electoral Code adopted in March 2023, which aimed to facilitate electoral participation for the elderly and people with disabilities by providing free transportation and improving access to polling stations. These measures, long demanded by civic organizations, were portrayed by MEPs as alleged attempts at electoral manipulation—even though their real purpose was to expand democratic inclusion. Such interpretation exposed the political bias of the EU institutions, which did not undertake any serious legal or factual analysis of the amendments.

Another target of criticism was the commission established to investigate Russian influence on Poland's internal security between 2007 and 2022. Set up in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and growing concerns about hybrid threats across Europe, this commission had an administrative nature and no judicial powers. Its goal was to investigate potential channels of Russian influence in Polish public life. Despite this, EU institutions labeled its creation as a threat to democracy—ignoring the geopolitical context and the fact that other Member States had undertaken similar analytical and preventive initiatives.

Yet another allegation concerned the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, whose legality was upheld by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Although the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled it inconsistent with EU law, Polish authorities emphasized that the organization of the judiciary lies exclusively within Member State competence. The Strasbourg debate disregarded this constitutional principle and domestic jurisprudence, presenting the CJEU's stance as supreme—effectively attempting to impose a single interpretation of EU law supremacy over the national constitution.

The entire debate was undeniably political in character. It was not an impartial expression of concern for democratic standards, but a blatant attempt to influence Poland's national election campaign. The accusations presented were not the result of an objective assessment of the situation in Poland, but rather the position of a specific political faction in the European Parliament—one intent on undermining a government disfavored by dominant circles in Brussels.

¹³ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



During the debate, Jeroen Lenaers, a representative of the European People's Party, called on the EU to take decisive action against Poland. Referring to demonstrations in Warsaw, he claimed that protesters look to the European Union with hope for help—help in stopping the ruling party from completely destroying what remains of democracy and the rule of law in Poland, and threatening Poland's place in the European Union. In particular, Lenaers attacked the law establishing the Commission to Investigate Russian Influence, calling it "Lex Tusk" and alleging that its goal was to eliminate the opposition from public life. He urged the European Commission to act immediately: "And if we do not act decisively enough, if we do not act quickly enough, damage will be done—and it will be too late to fix it."¹⁴ This was a direct attempt to pressure EU institutions to interfere in Poland's domestic political processes on the eve of elections.

The supposed "protection of the rule of law" has thus become a political weapon used by Tusk and his coalition—just as it is now being used by the camp of Péter Magyar. The use of Brussels-based eurocrats to apply pressure on democratically elected conservative governments is best exemplified by the fact that, in the name of defending the "rule of law," the European Commission launched Article 7 proceedings against Poland, accusing it—among other things—of implementing a judicial reform of the National Council of the Judiciary that allegedly violated EU standards. This, despite the fact that the reform was in line with the explicit provisions of the Polish Constitution, and that similar solutions had previously been proposed by Civic Platform (PO) politicians themselves before 2025.

Brussels ignored the diversity of judicial appointment systems across the EU and the absence of a uniform model, opting instead for a purely political stance. That this was a legally baseless political maneuver is confirmed by the fact that, after the 13 December coalition assumed power, the proceedings were quietly dropped—without any legal changes being made. This is the clearest evidence that the true objective was not the rule of law but regime change. Brussels' double standards—leniency toward its own elites and harshness toward sovereign, value-driven governments—have turned the concept of the rule of law into an ideological bludgeon for conducting political witch hunts.

2. The War in Ukraine and the 2023 Parliamentary Elections in Poland

The 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland were held under the shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which had not only geopolitical but also significant domestic economic and political consequences for countries in the region—Poland in particular. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Poland—especially the United Right government—emerged as one of Ukraine's principal allies. Prime Minister Mateusz

¹⁴ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Morawiecki and President Andrzej Duda were among the most active advocates of military, political, and humanitarian support for Kyiv.

It was from Warsaw that some of the first military aid convoys departed. Poland opened its borders to millions of Ukrainian refugees. Both Morawiecki and Duda made multiple visits to Kyiv, assuring President Zelensky of full support and solidarity. This phase of Polish-Ukrainian relations, which lasted through most of 2022 and the first half of 2023, was characterized by strong backing from the conservative government and the vast majority of Polish society. However, this approach increasingly came to be viewed as naive, particularly in light of Ukraine's continued failure to undertake meaningful actions in favor of Poland. There was still no consent to the exhumation of Polish victims of the Volhynia massacre committed by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943–44, and Ukrainian authorities not only refused to condemn but openly glorified individuals and organizations responsible for those atrocities. Nor did Poland benefit economically from Ukraine's post-war reconstruction planning: despite Poland's extensive economic support, it became increasingly clear that the primary beneficiaries of Ukraine's rebuilding efforts would be German and other Western European firms.

At the same time, from early 2023 onwards, a noticeable shift occurred in Ukraine's political positioning toward Poland. President Zelensky—until then relying heavily on Polish government support—began directing his political gestures and communications increasingly toward the opposition, particularly Donald Tusk. Although no explicit declarations of support were made via official channels, the tone of messaging, the selective choice of interlocutors, the avoidance of consultations with the PiS government, and the escalation of economic disputes—especially regarding grain imports—constituted a de facto act of political distancing from the United Right.

Donald Tusk, as leader of the opposition, exploited this new alignment during the campaign. On 26 September 2023, he declared: "Support for Ukraine in its war effort should not be up for debate... no one can or wants to question Poland's continued military assistance to Ukraine."¹⁵

Ukrainian media during the election campaign clearly distinguished Tusk as a "friend of Ukraine" while portraying the then-government as a problematic partner. These signals were interpreted in Warsaw as a failure of the Morawiecki government, which, despite its significant support for Ukraine, was unable to secure reciprocal benefits for Poland—a perception that was not entirely unjustified. At the same time, liberal media skillfully manipulated public opinion by portraying the government's firmer stance on Ukraine as

¹⁵ <https://www.polukr.net> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



"Russophile" behavior—an accusation which, given the Polish public's deep-seated distrust of Russia, effectively undermined the government's image.

Tensions peaked over the issue of Ukrainian agricultural imports, particularly grain. After the European Commission lifted its embargo, Poland—along with Hungary and Slovakia—unilaterally imposed import bans. Zelensky responded sharply in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2023: "Alarming, some in Europe play out solidarity in a political theater — turning grain into a thriller. They may seem to play their own roles. In fact, they're helping set the stage for a Moscow actor"¹⁶

Although Poland was not mentioned by name, the statement was widely perceived in Warsaw as a direct attack on the PiS government—especially given that Poland had borne the brunt of the influx of Ukrainian goods. At the same time, Zelensky refrained from criticizing the opposition, even though Tusk himself had expressed doubts about market openness—while carefully avoiding direct confrontation.

It is worth noting that President Zelensky's party, *Servant of the People*, has been an associate member of the European liberal party family ALDE/Renew Europe since February 2022. During the spring and summer of 2023, leading ALDE/Renew Europe figures—including representatives from Poland 2050 and Nowoczesna—referred to Ukraine as "already part of the European liberal family," thereby symbolically reinforcing Zelensky's alliance with the liberal wing of European politics.

Thus, prior to the 15 October 2023 election, Zelensky effectively shifted his alignment from the PiS-led government to liberal political forces—headed by Donald Tusk. This realignment had both symbolic and practical dimensions: from political gestures and rhetoric in the Ukrainian press to real economic disputes used as leverage during the campaign. For the Ukrainian leader, this was a calculated strategic move with tangible political consequences: it contributed to the strengthening of liberal parties and the weakening of a government that had previously provided Ukraine with unprecedented support during the most critical period in its history.

From the perspective of foreign policy and national sovereignty, this constitutes a textbook example of external influence on an electoral process. In this instance, the influence did not come solely from EU institutions or Western European governments, but also—quite symbolically—from the political elites of Ukraine, supported by the European liberal party family ALDE/Renew Europe.

¹⁶ <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1704197485483151717> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



3. Migration Policy

The First Migration Pact (2015)

In mid-2015, the Council of the European Union adopted the relocation mechanism for migrants from Greece and Italy (Council Decisions 2015/1601 and 2015/1523), initially covering 40,000 individuals, later expanded to 120,000. Hungary and the Czech Republic voted against the decisions. Poland, then governed by globalist forces, did not oppose the regulations, instead abstaining from the vote. At the time, the government spokesperson declared that Poland was ready to accept any number of illegal migrants: "As a country, we are prepared for any number of refugees. The goal is for the distribution of refugees in Europe to be fair. We will take on the burden of any decisions we make regarding refugees."¹⁷ Hungary, in contrast, immediately took a firm stance in protest and initiated a referendum process.

In the autumn of 2015, following the electoral victory of the Law and Justice (PiS) party and the formation of the Szydło government, Poland reversed its position—opting out of the relocation mechanism, citing border security and insufficient safety assurances. As a result, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure. In 2017, Donald Tusk, then President of the European Council, threatened the Polish government, warning that refusal to participate in migrant relocation "would have consequences."¹⁸ The dispute culminated in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 2 April 2020 (Cases C-715/17, C-718/17, C-719/17), in which the Court ruled that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had breached EU law by refusing to implement the relocation scheme. Citing an alleged lack of factual justification (sic!), the Court rejected the applicability of Article 72 TFEU—on which these countries had relied to invoke public order exceptions. This controversial and evidently political ruling paved the way for potential financial penalties—although no concrete sanctions were ultimately imposed.

Despite the 2020 CJEU ruling, Poland and Hungary, governed by sovereigntist administrations, continued to oppose compulsory relocation, viewing it as a violation of sovereignty and a matter of national strategic defense—an approach consistent with the preferences of the majority of Polish and Hungarian societies.

The New Migration Pact

The issue of "mandatory solidarity" re-emerged in 2023 as the work on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum neared completion. Formal discussions on the Pact began in September 2020, when the European Commission introduced a proposal for comprehensive

¹⁷ <https://www.rmfm24.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

¹⁸ <https://niezalezna.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



reform of EU migration policy. From the outset, Poland voiced its criticism, rejecting the notion of mandatory relocation and denouncing efforts to impose a framework that infringed upon Member States' sovereign control over their migration policies.

Throughout the negotiations, which continued over subsequent years, Poland—together with other Visegrád Group countries—consistently advocated for replacing compulsory relocation with the concept of "flexible solidarity." This model would allow Member States to offer technical or financial assistance without being required to accept migrants on their territory, while also emphasizing the need to strengthen the protection of the EU's external borders. Nevertheless, the European Commission and a majority of EU Member States pushed for a system requiring states to choose one of three options: accepting migrants, providing operational assistance, or paying €20,000 for each migrant not admitted.

In June 2023, the EU Council adopted the main elements of the Pact. Poland and Hungary voted firmly against it but were overruled through the qualified majority voting procedure. During subsequent legislative stages—including trilogues between the Council, Parliament, and Commission, and the final vote—Poland, under conservative rule, maintained its opposition. Nonetheless, a formal compromise was reached in December 2023, and the Pact was officially adopted in spring 2024.

The New Pact formally entered into force on 11 June 2024, with full implementation required by mid-2026 at the latest. One of its central components is the mechanism of so-called "mandatory solidarity," requiring the annual relocation of at least 30,000 migrants. Countries that choose not to process asylum applications will be required to pay €20,000 for each unprocessed case or offer alternative forms of solidarity.

During the 2025 electoral campaign, both Donald Tusk and Rafał Trzaskowski repeatedly claimed that Poland would not implement the Migration Pact or accept relocated refugees. During a European Commission meeting held in Gdańsk in February 2025, Tusk stated: "My reasoning was heard and understood: Poland will not implement the Migration Pact in a way that would impose additional migrant quotas on Poland."¹⁹ Likewise, in a presidential debate in May 2025, Trzaskowski—falsely—stated: "The Migration Pact will never enter into force. I was the one who inserted into EU documents that if we help the Ukrainians, we won't have to accept anyone else."

At the same time, international sources reported that the European Commission, along with Berlin and Paris, adopted the view that the migration issue should not be escalated in Poland shortly before the elections, so as not to harm the government's candidate. Consequently, actual implementation efforts were postponed until after the elections, even though the key

¹⁹ <https://www.bankier.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



provisions had already been finalized. *Le Monde* pointed to electoral considerations as the reason for Ursula von der Leyen's unusually lenient stance towards Tusk's government on such critical issues as immigration and the European Green Deal²⁰.

Hungary announced its intention to challenge the Pact before the Court of Justice of the EU, and resistance to the mandatory solidarity mechanism was growing in other countries as well, including the Netherlands and France.

Notably, in autumn 2023, alongside the parliamentary elections, a nationwide referendum was held at the initiative of the conservative parliamentary majority, with two of the four questions addressing security and migration issues. Under Polish law, referendum results are binding if turnout exceeds 50% of eligible voters.

One referendum question asked whether citizens supported accepting thousands of illegal migrants from the Middle East and Africa in accordance with a mandatory relocation mechanism imposed by EU bureaucracy. The aim was to secure a strong social mandate opposing Brussels-imposed solutions that would force Poland to receive illegal migrants from other European countries and create mechanisms (such as benefits exceeding average pensions) intended to incentivize their long-term stay in Poland.

The then-left-liberal opposition conducted an aggressive campaign urging voters not to take the referendum ballot, arguing—falsely—that the referendum was a political stunt by PiS. In reality, this anti-democratic stance by the left and liberals aimed to undermine binding outcomes on issues where—despite their misleading campaign promises—they did not intend to act in line with the will and interests of Polish citizens. Ultimately, around 95% of votes cast supported the PiS recommendations. However, since turnout did not surpass the 50% threshold (approximately 41% of eligible voters participated—roughly 10 million people), the referendum was not legally binding.

Interestingly, within just over a year, growing migration-related crises and a series of violent crimes committed by migrants led to a delayed shift in public opinion. By mid-July 2025, according to a *Rzeczpospolita* poll, three-quarters of Poles declared support for holding another referendum on migration.

Defence of the Border with Belarus

In 2021, a hybrid war began on the Polish-Belarusian border, initiated by Belarusian authorities in coordination with Russia. Belarusian and Russian security services transported migrants—many of whom included Russian and Belarusian criminals—to the Polish border with the explicit goal of destabilization through forced illegal crossings. Meanwhile, left-wing

²⁰ <https://www.lemonde.fr> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



and liberal media in Poland and Western Europe portrayed these aggressive individuals as helpless “war refugees” in need of support. The defensive measures undertaken by the Polish government under PiS were widely misrepresented as inhumane, illegal under international law, and allegedly motivated by authoritarian or xenophobic impulses. The objective of this campaign was to force the Polish government to admit large numbers of illegal and dangerous migrants, thereby undermining national security—just weeks before what would soon become the full-scale war in Ukraine.

At the time, the liberal opposition, led by Donald Tusk, advocated for admitting these migrants. Tusk stated they were simply “people looking for their place on Earth,” and one opposition MP demanded: “Let them all in; we’ll figure out who they are later.” Liberal opposition MPs disrupted the work of Polish border guards and soldiers by staging stunts at the border, abusing their parliamentary immunity to deliver pizza and sleeping bags to supposed “war refugees.” Their actions were often amplified by liberal celebrity activists. One such figure, Barbara Kurdej-Szatan, publicly labeled the border guards “murderers” and “mindless, heartless machines blindly following orders.” Her defamation case was ultimately dismissed by the Warsaw Regional Court—a decision widely seen as an expression of political bias in favor of the liberal side.

The Belarusian-Russian aggression was accompanied by manipulation techniques reminiscent of Barry Levinson’s *Wag the Dog*—emotional narratives intended to short-circuit rational thinking. Liberal media disseminated stories designed to elicit sympathy and outrage: a Syrian girl allegedly trekking for weeks while carrying a cat, or a young man supposedly swimming in the River Bug for six days to escape “dangerous” Polish forces. Fake news reports also surfaced, including claims of mass graves of murdered refugees supposedly dug by Polish foresters—coinciding with a broader liberal media smear campaign portraying Polish forestry as engaged in “mass deforestation.”

Many of these fabrications were later repeated in the propagandistic film *Green Border* by Agnieszka Holland. In response to these relentless assaults, the PiS government—following the examples of Hungary and President Trump—swiftly initiated the construction of a physical barrier along the Belarusian border, which prevented further escalation. The project was harshly criticized by the liberal opposition at the time. However, after winning power, the Tusk government—aware of the public’s overwhelmingly positive assessment of the border defence—attempted to rewrite the narrative: denying past statements, falsely claiming ownership of conservative achievements, and balancing this with rhetoric designed to appease left-wing activist groups.

One of the questions in the nationwide referendum on 15 October 2023 directly addressed the barrier on the border between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus. The



then-globalist opposition continued its campaign against effective border protection by calling for a boycott of the referendum.

The complete reversal of Tusk and his liberal allies' stance on border protection before and after assuming power reveals the extent to which this issue was opportunistically used to attack the United Right government. In reality, it was an assault on the state itself—its institutions and the security of its citizens.

Permissiveness of Tusk's Government Toward Migrant Transfers from Germany

From 2024 through mid-2025, the German Federal Police systematically carried out pushbacks of migrants at the Polish border. At least several thousand individuals were returned to Polish territory without access to asylum procedures, without Polish authorities' participation, and outside the scope of the Dublin Regulation. These operations—effectively migrant transfers—were reported by German media outlets (*Welt*, *FAZ*), the NGO Pro Asyl, and various Polish investigative journalists.

These facts were legally confirmed in a ruling by the Administrative Court of Berlin on 2 June 2025. In adjudicating the case of three Somali nationals, the Court held that German authorities had violated EU law, specifically the Dublin III Regulation. The judgment stated: "The rejection of asylum seekers at the border ... violates asylum laws ... obligations under the Dublin system." The Court also rejected Germany's invocation of Article 72 TFEU (public order exemption), noting that no evidence had been provided to justify its application²¹.

Nonetheless, top German officials—including Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt—announced that, despite the court ruling, existing practices would continue, asserting that the decision applied only to individual cases²².

In Poland, despite the ongoing problem with these illegal pushbacks, Donald Tusk's government—via statements from Tusk himself and Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak—continued to manipulate public perception by conflating illegal transfers with lawful returns under Dublin III. "Migrants are being returned from Germany under Dublin and readmission procedures... 688 people in 2024... PiS let them in and lied about it," or more directly: "The supposed illegal returns of migrants from Germany to Poland are PiS propaganda."

This narrative was heavily promoted in May and June 2025, just before the presidential election, and—according to many commentators—was intended to deflect criticism from Rafał Trzaskowski and safeguard the electoral prospects of the governing coalition.

²¹ <https://www.berlin.de> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

²² <https://www.reuters.com> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



The conservative opposition in Poland had been drawing attention to this issue for months. Leading PiS figures, including Jarosław Kaczyński and Beata Szydło, publicly warned that Poland was being turned into a "buffer zone for Germany," and that the real number of illegal pushbacks exceeded 10,000 migrants. Beata Szydło declared: "10,000 migrants pushed into Poland from Germany since January 2024! This is official data from the German Federal Police. Tusk allows Poland to be flooded with migrants Germany wants to get rid of."²³

In June 2025, MP Marcin Romanowski filed a formal criminal complaint against several Polish ministers, including Tusk and Siemoniak, accusing them of dereliction of duty and acting against the national interest by tacitly permitting the illegal intake of migrants and failing to respond diplomatically or legally²⁴.

The illegality of German pushbacks has been confirmed by a German court, yet Tusk's government continued to obscure the issue through misleading references to Dublin III statistics—portraying itself as rational and restrained. Meanwhile, PiS and the conservative opposition consistently highlighted the true scope of the threat to Poland's sovereignty and public safety, demanding a strong state response.

The Berlin Administrative Court ruling provided Poland with a solid legal basis to escalate the issue diplomatically and politically against both Berlin and the European Commission. Yet the Tusk government's passive and submissive posture has demonstrated an alignment with German interests over national ones.

Polish security services have also failed to assertively counter German authorities transporting migrants into Poland under so-called "accelerated readmission." This lack of action appears to be the result of high-level political agreements. In the face of state inaction, Polish society responded with grassroots mobilization. Nationalist, conservative, and football fan communities organized under the leadership of Robert Bąkiewicz to form the *Border Defence Movement*. These citizen patrols conducted legal citizen arrests of illegal migrants, documented German transfers into Poland, and shared their findings via social media and independent outlets.

Initially, Tusk's government denied the existence of any problem. But under mounting public pressure and grassroots mobilization, it introduced border controls with Germany (and also Lithuania). However, these controls quickly appeared to be a pretext to eliminate the presence of *Border Defence Movement* volunteers. Authorities attempted—without legal basis—to ban the use of drones, which volunteers had used to monitor migrant movements. These drones were purchased with public crowdfunding. Government spokespersons even

²³ <https://x.com/BeataSzydlo/status/1910591555288678660> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

²⁴ <https://x.com/RomanowskiPL/status/1930497310657761294> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



threatened Robert Bąkiewicz with prosecution and intervention by the Internal Security Agency, falsely alleging foreign influence.

This episode illustrates how, under the Brussels- and Berlin-aligned Tusk government, the Polish state has abdicated its most basic function: protecting its citizens against external threats—specifically the illegal or unjustified transfer of migrants into Polish territory.

4. The Threat of Gender Ideology to Children

Between 2015 and 2023, the Law and Justice (PiS) government consistently opposed the globalist agenda promoting legal and social changes inspired by woke ideology, both domestically and at the European and international levels. In particular, the Ministry of Justice conducted active legislative, political, and legal efforts to shield the Polish legal order—especially children—from ideological corruption. These efforts challenged the political, economic, and ideological interests of left-liberal circles in Poland and stood in sharp contrast to the direction of the European liberal establishment.

Notably, during the conservative government's tenure, the main institutional opponent in the areas of religious freedom, anti-woke policy, and pro-family advocacy was Adam Bodnar, elected in 2015 by a liberal majority as Poland's Ombudsman. A human rights lawyer with strong ties to George Soros's Open Society Foundation, Bodnar later became Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General on 13 December 2023. Since taking office, he has aggressively and unlawfully pursued former leaders of the Ministry and the prosecution service while systematically dismantling their initiatives, institutions, and policies in order to impose his own woke ideological agenda.

Under the PiS government, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Justice effectively resisted strategic litigation initiated by the Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH), which sought to circumvent Polish law and introduce same-sex adoption through judicial precedent. With the support of Ombudsman Bodnar and funding from organizations such as USAID, KPH launched legal cases aimed at forcing the transcription of foreign same-sex marriage certificates and birth certificates listing same-sex "parents." Ultimately, the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) confirmed in landmark rulings (including case II OPS 1/19) that such transcriptions are not permissible under Polish law.

The Ministry also prepared a legislative proposal titled *"Mom, Dad and Children"*, which aimed to codify the principle that only marriages between one woman and one man may be registered in civil records and that legal parenthood must be based on such unions. Although the proposal was finalized and internally approved, it was never submitted to Parliament due to the government's lack of political will. After taking power, the new left-liberal government withdrew the proposal entirely. The failure to enact this legislation exemplifies the conservative government's inconsistency and lack of resolve in confronting the woke



threat—paving the way for the continued advance of globalist and neo-Marxist ideologues through state institutions and society. In contrast, Hungary enacted robust legal protections for children and families, effectively safeguarding its legal system from ideological subversion.

The actions and communications of Tusk's left-liberal coalition reveal a deliberate strategy of concealing true intentions on gender ideology for electoral gain. A case in point is the adoption of legislation simplifying the process of so-called "gender change," which in practice facilitates the irreversible mutilation of minors without biological or somatic justification or proper diagnoses of gender dysphoria. On 8 January 2025, during a meeting of the Parliamentary Team for LGBT+ Equality, Equality Minister Katarzyna Kotula admitted that the government had a political green light to advance a gender-recognition bill. However, she explained that the coalition had decided not to proceed with the issue before the presidential election in order to avoid alienating conservative voters. She added, "We've decided not to talk about it until the end of the presidential campaign and the legislative process on civil partnerships."²⁵

This was an open admission of deliberately hiding policy intentions, while publicly the government portrayed itself as moderate or even conservative in opposing gender ideology. As many commentators noted, this reflected a classic political strategy of postponing divisive issues—such as abortion, civil partnerships, and gender reassignment—until after elections. This strategy, known as "salami tactics," resembles the metaphor of "boiling the frog" or the "slippery slope," whereby demands are met incrementally: first, the passage of a civil partnership law, followed later by full-fledged gender-change legislation.

This confirms that the delay was a calculated communications strategy, not a mere legislative coincidence—exposing the disconnect between the government's public image of moderation and the underlying gender-liberal agenda of its political base.

Rafał Trzaskowski's campaign further exemplified the tactic of concealing woke views. Trzaskowski is among the most progressive figures in Civic Platform (PO). As Mayor of Warsaw, he signed the LGBT+ Declaration in 2019, committing to finance sexual education in line with WHO standards—which include, among other things, the promotion of childhood masturbation and queer theory. He repeatedly declared Warsaw to be a "city of diversity" and allocated funding to LGBT+ initiatives. In 2024, the city financed Europe's first Queer Museum, which Trzaskowski hailed as a symbol of pride and openness. Under his leadership, Warsaw also channeled substantial funds to radical left-wing and woke initiatives, including LGBT+ hostels, festivals, and provocative projects involving drag queens, drug use, and prostitution advocacy.

²⁵ <https://dorzeczy.pl/> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Yet during the 2025 presidential campaign, Trzaskowski deliberately avoided rainbow symbolism and LGBT topics. In May 2025, just before a major campaign rally on Kraków's Main Square, rainbow flags bearing the slogan "Kraków for Equality" were hastily removed and replaced by Polish national flags. The city claimed the change was for "technical and visual consistency," but the timing strongly suggested an effort to obscure pro-LGBT affiliations from a conservative electorate.

A particularly striking moment came during the presidential debate when conservative candidate Karol Nawrocki handed Trzaskowski a rainbow flag—only for Trzaskowski to discreetly hide it. The openly left-wing candidate Magdalena Biejat then approached him, stating, "I'm not ashamed of it," and took the flag from him on stage. The incident became a symbol of Trzaskowski's ambivalent stance, caught between his progressive record and his attempts to appeal to the center-right electorate.

Some campaign episodes were outright embarrassing, such as the legal threats issued by *Gazeta Wyborcza* for sharing an old photo of Trzaskowski at an LGBT parade, standing beside a bearded man dressed as a woman. Another example involved a carefully staged event in which Trzaskowski, while campaigning in a rural town, accepted an image of Saint Florian—the patron saint of firefighters—even though, months earlier, Warsaw had imposed restrictions on the display of crosses in public offices. Many observers saw this gesture as a hypocritical attempt to appeal to voters long mocked by metropolitan elites as backward or provincial.

Trzaskowski's calculated image as a "soft conservative" and the avoidance of LGBT issues were part of a broader electoral strategy targeting the second round of the election—on the assumption that openly left-wing voters would support him regardless of messaging, while undecided centrists might be swayed by his moderate façade.

In reality, this orchestrated moderation was a cover for the same gender-radical agenda pursued since 2019—an agenda that continues to pose a systemic threat to the legal and moral fabric of Polish society.

5. The Liberal Double-Tongue Strategy: Hate Speech and the Language of Love

Following the political upheaval triggered by the exposure of the so-called Rywin affair, the 2005 presidential election was won by Lech Kaczyński, and nearly 80% of parliamentary votes went to parties critical of the post-communist establishment of the Third Republic of Poland. Yet it soon became clear that for some of these parties, the criticism was largely rhetorical. The post-election coalition most Poles had expected—between Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS)—never materialized. Donald Tusk, who had lost the presidential race to Lech Kaczyński that same year, instead chose a path of sharp opposition.



Despite presenting himself as a proponent of national unity, he launched what has since become a near-continuous campaign of political polarization.

Since that time, the liberal-left camp associated with Civic Platform has consistently relied on aggressive, often vulgar and brutal rhetoric in public discourse. Donald Tusk not only tolerated this radicalization but actively encouraged it by promoting figures such as Janusz Palikot, notorious for his anti-clerical stunts and inflammatory language. While still a PO member of parliament (2005–2007), Palikot became infamous in 2007 when, during a press conference in Lublin, he held up a rubber phallus and a toy gun, claiming they symbolized the PiS party and the police. This was framed as a “protest” against alleged state censorship and violence²⁶.

Another example is Stefan Niesiołowski, former PO deputy and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm (2005–2007), later a prominent figure in the KO alliance, who declared to a TVP journalist during a parliamentary exchange: “You don’t talk to rabble — get lost!”²⁷ Such dehumanizing language signaled an intent not merely to oppose but to delegitimize and exclude political opponents from the democratic debate altogether.

The intensity of this symbolic violence escalated in the aftermath of the 2010 Smolensk air disaster. Those mourning President Lech Kaczyński and the victims were systematically mocked. Left-wing and liberal activists staged profane demonstrations — erecting crosses made from beer cans, extinguishing candles by urinating on them, and wielding vulgar slogans and offensive banners.

Radosław Sikorski, then Minister of National Defence and later Foreign Minister and Sejm Speaker, further fueled political hostility during a Civic Platform rally on 14 October 2007. From the stage, he told Donald Tusk, “One more battle, and we’ll finish off the pack.” Ironically, just moments later, Tusk stood before the same audience and called for “an end to the Polish-Polish war,” appealing to values of love, unity, and moral light. This blatant contradiction — militant rhetoric alongside appeals to unity — became the hallmark of Civic Platform’s two-faced communications strategy²⁸.

On October 19, 2010, one of the most dramatic acts of political violence in the history of the Third Polish Republic took place in Łódź. Ryszard Cyba, armed with a handgun, knife, and stun gun, stormed into the Law and Justice (PiS) parliamentary office, where he murdered Marek Rosiak — a PiS activist and assistant to MEP Janusz Wojciechowski. He seriously injured another man, Paweł Kowalski. During his arrest, Cyba admitted that he hated Law

²⁶ <https://tvn24.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

²⁷ <https://www.tysol.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

²⁸ <https://tvn24.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



and Justice and that his aim was the physical elimination of Jarosław Kaczyński and other politicians of that party²⁹.

The murder was politically motivated — driven by ideological hatred and fueled by years of aggressive political and media rhetoric directed against conservative circles. Cyba, who had previously expressed sympathies with the liberal opposition, was — as the court determined — a conscious perpetrator of the crime, and his actions were not the result of mental illness.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment. During the so-called second Tusk government in 2025, the execution of his sentence was suspended, sparking widespread outrage. The decision coincided with the death of a close associate of Jarosław Kaczyński, which occurred shortly after a politically motivated and aggressive interrogation at the public prosecutor's office, and was perceived as an act of provocation against the conservative camp.

The Łódź murder became a stark warning about the lethal consequences of a hate-driven political narrative. It stands as proof that the liberal-left's campaign of contempt — amplified by its media ecosystem — not only fostered extreme polarization but led directly to deadly violence.

Importantly, this wasn't a fringe phenomenon but a core element of liberal strategy: aggression toward conservatives was not merely tolerated but often celebrated in progressive media bubbles. Research by the University of Warsaw (2018) found that opposition voters—particularly supporters of Civic Platform—were significantly more likely than PiS voters to dehumanize their political opponents, attributing to them immoral or even subhuman traits. Yet paradoxically, left-liberal voters themselves believed they were more often dehumanized by their rivals³⁰.

A similar rhetoric—marked by contempt, aggression, and the delegitimization of opponents—was continued by the globalist camp even during the rule of the United Right. Liberal media and political circles routinely employed accusations of "rule of law violations" as a tool of international pressure. Vulgar and aggressive protests were organized, along with street mobilizations, defamatory campaigns in Western media, and the use of European Union institutions, as well as the liberal American and Western European press, to exert political pressure on the government in Warsaw.

A particularly striking example of this aggressive mobilization were the demonstrations held in response to the October 2020 ruling of the Constitutional Court, which found eugenic abortion to be incompatible with the constitutional right to life. This ruling was used as a pretext for physical attacks on churches and protests in which left-wing and liberal

²⁹ <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³⁰ <https://www.rp.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



opposition politicians actively participated, chanting vulgar and aggressive slogans alongside the demonstrators.

A current example of the degradation of public discourse is the activity of the "Silni Razem" movement, which actively supports Roman Giertych and other figures from the anti-government front, frequently resorting to hateful and vulgar language directed at right-wing voters.

We are thus confronted with a paradoxical and dangerous situation: the very circles that for years have fueled political hatred and exclusion now seek to rebrand themselves as the face of a "smiling Poland"—the official slogan of the Civic Coalition during the 2023 election campaign. Their rhetoric around "ending the Polish-Polish war" has become equally hollow, given that it was their own strategy of escalation that sparked and perpetuated the very conflict they now claim to want to resolve.

6. The 2023 Parliamentary Elections as the Result of Long-Term Liberal Manipulation

One of the most paradoxical and simultaneously dangerous elements of the 2023 election campaign was the strategy of simultaneously employing the rhetoric of strong polarization and symbolic violence, while at the same time crafting the image of a "smiling Poland." On one hand, the message of the Civic Coalition and its affiliated circles appealed to emotions of fear, aversion, and at times even hatred toward Law and Justice; on the other, it adopted the aesthetics of apparent gentleness, positivity, and European optimism. As a result, the dominant emotion mobilizing the opposition electorate was not hope or unity around a common vision, but hostility toward the ruling party. It was a campaign in which the language of exclusion, aggression, and ridiculing the opponent intermingled with slogans about ending the "Polish-Polish war," reconciliation, and community — creating a message that was incoherent yet rhetorically effective. This contrast between form and content was not accidental, but rather an element of a deliberate strategy, whose long-term effect became not only deep social fragmentation but also an atmosphere of acceptance for radicalization and political violence in the public sphere.

The October 2023 parliamentary elections were unprecedented in terms of social mobilization — turnout exceeded 74%, the highest level in the history of the Third Republic of Poland. However, as numerous public opinion surveys show, this high turnout was not the result of growing support for Donald Tusk or his Civic Coalition, but rather a broad mobilization against the Law and Justice party and Jarosław Kaczyński, who had ruled for 8 years.

Reports from CBOS, the Batory Foundation, and More in Common clearly indicate that a significant portion of voters — especially younger ones — did not vote out of conviction for KO's programmatic offer, but out of fear of continued PiS rule. The studies were dominated



by negative motivations: concern for the future of democracy, aversion to confrontational rhetoric, fatigue with the long-standing personal conflict between Tusk and Kaczyński. As the CBOS report notes, "one in four people participating in the elections (26%) admitted they voted 'negatively', meaning they were primarily motivated by a desire to weaken the chances of a party they opposed" (CBOS Flash No. 6/2023)³¹.

Moreover, analyses showed that the KO campaign — focused mainly on attacks against PiS — did not generate mass enthusiasm and was in fact assessed as exhausting and overly aggressive. The Batory Foundation report noted that the record turnout was not due to the opposition parties encouraging voters with their program — the main driving force was aversion to the ruling party and the desire for change ("The Phenomenon of Electoral Mobilization," January 2024)³². Meanwhile, the authors of the More in Common study directly state that the opposition's victory was made possible by uniting a broad front of voters with diverse identities — not around a shared vision, but around opposition to PiS. As much as 64% of the society believed that "things were going in the wrong direction," and dissatisfaction among opposition voters reached about 80% — which in turn indicates that their motivation was much more rooted in opposition than in enthusiasm³³.

These conclusions are key to understanding the structure of the new government's social mandate — the new administration did not enjoy enthusiastic support but came to power mainly thanks to opposition votes against its predecessors. Such a mandate carries the risk of rapid disillusionment if it is not reinforced by tangible actions and consistent communication that respond to societal needs.

And indeed — after just a year and a half of Donald Tusk's rule, opinion polls showed the lowest ratings for a government in the history of the Third Republic of Poland. According to a May 2025 CBOS poll, support for the government stood at only 32%, with 44% expressing negative opinions³⁴. Additionally, the April CBOS survey indicated that only 35% of the public approved of the prime minister, while 51% disapproved of his government³⁵. Corresponding data from CBOS and UCE Research confirm these negative trends, showing a declining number of satisfied citizens and an increase in dissatisfaction among more than half of the population. This level of dissatisfaction turned out to be the highest compared to previous governments of the Third Republic. Simultaneously, from May 2025 onwards, party preference polls for parliamentary elections indicated that the current ruling coalition would lose power, and a significant majority in the parliament would be held by right-wing parties

³¹ <https://www.cbos.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³² [Fenomen.wyborczej.mobilizacji RAPORT.pdf](#) (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³³ [Polacy-gotowi-na-zmiane.pdf](#) (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³⁴ <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

³⁵ <https://wydarzenia.interia.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



— PiS and Confederation. Particularly low ratings were recorded by the centrist party of Sejm Marshal Szymon Hołownia (Polska 2050) and Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz's agrarian Polish People's Party. These parties formed a coalition in 2023 under the name "Third Way," presenting themselves as an alternative to both PiS and PO, thereby gaining several percent of the vote and taking votes from the anti-systemic and anti-establishment Confederation. In reality, however, it was the electoral result of the "Third Way," with over 60 seats in the Sejm, that largely opened the path to power for Tusk. After several months, Poles realized that by voting for the "reasonable center," they had in fact voted for Tusk's incompetent, lawless government.

This mandate crisis is the result of deep coalition inconsistency. While the slogan "removing PiS" did in fact unite diverse groups at the ballot box, after the elections there was a lack of a common program, well-prepared staff, and ready projects responding to the real expectations of Poles. In practice, the government focused primarily on so-called "accountability" of its predecessors — however, many of these actions took the form of media stunts rather than genuine investigations. The narrative of "PiS scandals" turned out to be an inflated bubble of slander and manipulation — an element of a campaign aimed at strengthening PO's image and defaming PiS.

7. Tusk's Unfulfilled Promises

For most of the campaign leading up to the 2023 parliamentary elections, Tusk avoided formulating a concrete, coherent program. This was due to the fact that the so-called "democratic coalition" — a bloc of parties united essentially by one goal: "to remove PiS from power," or to put it bluntly — "to seize power" — had few common programmatic areas. Therefore, only at the end of the campaign did Tusk present the "100 specifics," which were to be implemented within the first 100 days of the new government³⁶. The aim was to create the impression of effectiveness. At the same time, the intention was also to cause communication chaos — in practice, each of these specifics was lost in a flood of further promises, so that aside from a general, chaotic vision of "promising everything to everyone," it was difficult to identify truly key program points. And no wonder — in fact, there were none, because the main goal of this alliance was simply to gain power.

Presenting the 100 specifics, Tusk said: "I want to tell you that my belief that after just one hundred days people will have more, stores will be cheaper, and every Polish home will be better off, has a solid foundation in our competencies and calculations. Do you know what this possible miracle is about when it comes to the consequences of a change in government? If Poland once again has a responsible government that understands how the economy works, the money will appear almost automatically. I am answering right away to

³⁶ <https://100konkretow.pl/wszystkie-konkrety/> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



all those who will ask you these questions. For me, this credibility is absolutely key." After just a few months, Tusk and his words became synonymous with lies, manipulation, and unfulfilled promises.

During the election campaign, the "100 specifics" turned out to be a communication success also because Poles — accustomed during the eight years of PiS rule to the fact that electoral promises are actually fulfilled — too easily believed in them. Meanwhile, after the appointment of the left-liberal government on 13 December 2023, within the first 100 days, instead of one hundred, only six points were fully implemented³⁷. Importantly, none of these were key or particularly complex actions.

The first implemented "specific" was the mere decision to submit a draft law raising the social pension — a simple project that was not even passed by parliament. The implementation of anti-violence policy was also started — as declared in the electoral program — although this policy had been continuously pursued by the conservative government (albeit without a gender-based framework), and Tusk's government's actions in practice consisted of implementing solutions already functioning earlier, e.g., introduced by the PiS government in 2020 and 2023, allowing immediate separation of the perpetrator from the victim according to the proven Austrian model. Thirdly, a government-funded children's helpline was launched, which was primarily a propaganda gesture, as similar support tools had existed for a long time. The promise to appoint a new Ombudsman for Children was also fulfilled — although this was a step resulting from the normal procedural course related to the end of the term of the previous ombudsman. The government also boasted of obtaining funds from EU sources — without mentioning that they had previously been blocked by the same circles as part of a political blackmail campaign aimed at removing the conservative government from power. And the unblocking of these funds did not yet mean their actual, effective use for the benefit of citizens. Finally, the Ministry of Industry with headquarters in Silesia was established — in practice only "on paper," as a typical populist gesture, without any real impact on the functioning of an effective institution.

As a result, the first 100 days of the new government did not bring about spectacular reforms, but rather examples of political PR aimed at sustaining the narrative of the effectiveness of the December 13 coalition — in reality, however, it revealed its structural weakness and lack of real achievements.

Donald Tusk's program promised comprehensive support for Polish families and mothers. It included state-funded IVF (minimum PLN 500 million), free labor anesthesia, access to prenatal tests, and over-the-counter emergency contraception. Plans also covered the removal of hospital treatment limits, establishment of county health centers, and increased

³⁷ <https://demagog.org.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



support for geriatrics and long-term care, financed with EU funds. Some actions—such as funding for IVF and free anesthesia—were promoted by the government already in 2024. However, in most areas, no real improvements for patients materialized, and the healthcare system continues to deteriorate.

In education, the coalition promised systemic reforms: online appointment registration, a dental voucher for children, digital textbooks, single-shift schooling in primary schools, elimination of homework, and greater autonomy for schools and universities. In practice, only e-registration and dental vouchers were implemented; most other initiatives remain in the planning phase.

The Civic Platform (PO) proposed an expansive pro-family package: a "granny allowance" (PLN 1,500 monthly for childcare under age 3), support for nurseries and childcare clubs, a care voucher, a 150% minimum wage funeral benefit, doubled alimony payments up to PLN 1,000, and the elimination of the disability pension trap.

The coalition also promised major tax cuts: cash-based PIT for entrepreneurs, raising the tax-free allowance to PLN 60,000, lower PIT for retirees and entrepreneurs, eliminating capital gains tax up to PLN 100,000, 8% VAT for the beauty industry, and 0% VAT for public transport.

In housing and investment, the plan included rent subsidies for young people (PLN 600), 0% loans for first-time homebuyers, unlocking land from state institutions, and allocating PLN 10 billion to renovate vacant buildings and support TBS (Social Housing Associations). It also promised to improve and expand municipal housing stock. To date, most initiatives remain in the consultation phase.

The program foresaw support for prosumers and wind energy, the development of energy communities, gas price freezes, a green transition plan, citizen profit-sharing from renewables, nuclear plant construction, and a coherent transition strategy.

The coalition promised to depoliticize the judiciary, separate the roles of Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General, create new institutions (KRS, Constitutional Court), "restore independence" to public media, combat alleged corruption in state-owned companies, and prosecute alleged "scandals" from the PiS era.

In national defense and security, promises included an army audit, reinstating dismissed soldiers, expanding air defense (Patriot systems, drones), banning partisan use of military uniforms, and joining the European Missile Shield.



After one year in office, only 15 of 100 campaign promises were fully realized according to Demagog, while 27 were in progress or under review. The remaining 58 were unfulfilled, with 4 officially frozen³⁸.

Thus, the "100 concrete pledges" turned out to be promotional slogans requiring extensive funding and broad political consensus—including support from the President. Most core points remain stalled at the planning or half-measure stage.

This was reflected in a statement by then-Minister of Science and Higher Education Dariusz Wiecezorek (Left), during a November 2024 interview. When asked if he would apologize for the promise of "dorms for 1 zloty"—a pledge made by his Third Way coalition partner—he laughed and confirmed: "Yes, heh heh."³⁹ The remark drew widespread criticism—some called it "controversial honesty," others accused him of mocking voters.

A symbolic example of Civic Platform's credibility after 18 months in power came in May 2025. In a Polsat News interview, PO MP Przemysław Witek was asked about presidential candidate Rafał Trzaskowski's claim that he would not sign any law raising taxes. After confirming support, Witek added with laughter, "What's the harm in promising?"⁴⁰ Though the party later sanctioned him, most observers saw this as punishment for revealing an inconvenient truth.

These and similar episodes highlight the cynical treatment of campaign promises by the left-liberal coalition. Notably, most blunders came from mid-tier politicians with weaker communication discipline. A contrasting approach was taken by Péter Magyar in Hungary, who tightly controlled campaign messaging—partly to avoid such slip-ups in a strategy based on manipulation.

8. Political Manipulation in the "Collapsing State" Narrative

One of Civic Platform's central narratives between 2015 and 2023—and especially in the 2023 campaign—was the supposed erosion of the state under PiS rule. The notion of a "cardboard state" was a communications tool used to portray PiS as incompetent and unable to handle crises. In reality, this narrative relied on propagandized exaggeration of isolated events, falsely framed as systemic collapse.

For instance, in March 2022, a nationwide outage in the railway traffic control system (LCS) caused delays to around 1,300 trains, including stoppages in Skierniewice, Gdynia, and Grodzisk Mazowiecki. The root cause was a time-format update error in the

³⁸ <https://demagog.org.pl>.

³⁹ <https://finanse.wp.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁴⁰ <https://tvn24.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Bombardier/Alstom software⁴¹. Nonetheless, PO and sympathetic media portrayed it as "systemic infrastructure chaos" and evidence of a "failed state."

Another case was a low pass by a Black Hawk helicopter in September 2023 during the "Autumn Fire" military show near Orzysz. The helicopter flew unusually close to spectators, which aviation experts considered a procedural breach. Though the Ministry of Defense confirmed that the event met standards, PO declared it proof of "crumbling aviation norms" and "state incompetence."⁴²

In August 2021, after Kabul fell to the Taliban, the United Right government conducted a highly efficient evacuation operation from Afghanistan. Coordinated by the Foreign and Defense Ministries, it involved 14 military and civilian flights and evacuated around 1,300 people, including Polish citizens, NGO workers, and NATO collaborators. Humanitarian visas were issued swiftly, and logistics were handled with full involvement of the military and consular staff⁴³.

Despite the operation's success, PO accused the government of delays, poor communication, and lack of a pre-existing evacuation plan—allegations that stood in contrast to the actual professionalism and efficiency displayed.

These examples reveal a pattern: technical, procedural, or perception-based issues were spun as proof of systemic state failure. Amplifying such events through PO messaging and media served to construct an image of PiS as structurally inept. Even in crisis scenarios handled effectively by the PiS government, the opposition seized on them to claim incompetence, delay, and lack of empathy—demonstrating a manipulative use of foreign policy and citizen security by the globalist opposition.

One of the biggest campaign themes for PO in 2023—and among the most unfulfilled promises—was healthcare reform. Public statements focused on NFZ debt, long queues to specialists, and hospital ward closures—even though hospitals had been systematically equipped with modern equipment. These attacks were a staple of all opposition parties' campaigns, attempting to depict the healthcare system as a crisis zone after eight years of PiS rule, with promises of immediate improvement after victory.

Among the "100 specifics" announced by Tusk was the removal of NFZ limits on hospital treatment, establishment of county health centers, and EU-funded support for geriatrics and long-term care. Yet no real improvements followed, and the healthcare system is in even deeper decline.

⁴¹ <https://www.rynek-kolejowy.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁴² <https://tvn24.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁴³ <https://www.rp.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Not only was the pace and scale of reforms disappointing, but left-liberal governance has pushed healthcare into outright collapse. Systemic reforms have not materialized—hospital treatment limits persist, wait times grow, especially for seniors. The government canceled an oncology funding contest and reallocated funds elsewhere. Shortages in medical staff—doctors and nurses—are worsening. Poland faces a lack of specialists: internists, pediatricians, vascular surgeons, and anesthesiologists, and the government lacks any remedy. Worse still, systemic solutions like opening new medical programs were blocked, undermining trust between universities and the state. More facilities operate on the brink of staffing collapse, extending wait times and reducing care availability.

The NFZ itself suffers from a historic budget gap—estimated at PLN 30 billion—forcing cuts and payment delays. Healthcare professionals, by their own and their directors' assessment, are unable to treat patients adequately. Experts and patients alike criticize not only the absence of breakthrough reforms, but the government's incompetence in routine healthcare management.

An emblematic example of PO's absurd healthcare promises was the statement by Izabela Leszczyna in September 2022—later Minister of Health in Tusk's government—who said in an interview that after PO's victory, "problems will disappear like with a magic wand."⁴⁴ Yet by January 2024, one month into her tenure, she admitted: "You can't fix everything with a magic wand"⁴⁵—when asked about the promised reduction in specialist wait times within the first 100 days.

Another symbolic case came from the Poland 2050 leader, later Speaker of the Sejm. Criticizing PiS healthcare policies, he presented his vision: every citizen would have a dedicated physician who would call them weekly to ask how they're feeling. The goal was to replace self-initiated teleconsultations with proactive doctor outreach: "He will call, order preventive exams, refer you to specialists, and book appointments nearby!"⁴⁶ It goes without saying how stark the contrast is between the idyllic vision presented by the current Speaker of the Sejm and the grim reality of years-long waiting lists for medical procedures.

In reality, despite numerous shortcomings, the governments of the United Right demonstrated the state's capacity for action, breaking through what Jarosław Kaczyński described as "imposybilism." During the 2023 election campaign, Tusk managed to distort this image to some extent—both through the relentless negative narrative pushed by liberal politicians and dominant liberal media, and due to a natural sense of fatigue with PiS politicians after eight years in power. At the same time, he succeeded in presenting himself

⁴⁴ <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁴⁵ https://x.com/Rozmowa_RM/status/1752769084914057583 (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁴⁶ <https://x.com/MarcinHenka/status/1394702612428169220> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



as an efficient, capable leader who could “get things done.” However, the reality that followed just months later diverged sharply from this propagandistic vision. A telling example is the July 2025 poll, which showed that 54.2% of Poles view Donald Tusk as an ineffective prime minister, while only 37.2% consider him effective. Notably, among some of his coalition partners—voters of Poland 2050 and the Polish People's Party (PSL), known as the “Third Way”—only 32% rated him positively, 39% negatively, and as many as 29% were undecided.

9. Influence of Foreign Funding on the 2023 and 2025 Elections

The 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland took place amid growing political polarization and a marked increase in informal online campaigns. Subsequent journalistic investigations⁴⁷ revealed that some of these campaigns may have constituted coordinated and partially foreign interference in the democratic process. In particular, they concerned campaigns conducted by entities linked to the international WPC Group network, whose main operator in Central and Eastern Europe was the company Estratos Digital GmbH (formerly known as DatAdat).

In Hungary, organizations connected to DatAdat (later Estratos) played a key role in the opposition’s 2022 election campaign. According to journalistic reports and documents from Hungarian intelligence services, DatAdat provided digital infrastructure, tools for political targeting, and contact lists used in mass SMS campaigns. The campaign was financed from foreign sources, primarily the U.S.-based Action for Democracy foundation, which—according to the investigative portal VSquare—transferred over USD 11 million to Hungary, of which USD 7.75 million allegedly went directly to companies linked to DatAdat.

Hungarian authorities also revealed instances of illegal processing of personal data and concealment of campaign financing sources. Serious allegations of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the state emerged. Despite the massive scale of operations and financial backing, the opposition failed to defeat Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party. The 2022 Hungarian campaign became a kind of “testing ground” for DatAdat/Estratos, with the schemes and techniques used later transferred and expanded during Poland’s 2023 and 2025 election campaigns.

During the 2023 campaign in Poland, social media (particularly Facebook) were used to conduct intensive campaigns promoting voter turnout and directly attacking conservative parties such as Law and Justice (PiS) and Confederation. A key role was played by the Facebook profile “Do:łącz,” launched in February 2023, which published 499 ads reaching over 70 million users and amounting to a total value of PLN 1.4 million. Though these were

⁴⁷ <https://demagog.org.pl>; <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl>; <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



presented as grassroots civic initiatives, they were in fact highly political: encouraging participation in opposition events (e.g., Civic Platform marches) while discouraging participation in the government-organized referendum or support for right-wing parties. These activities were not financed by official electoral committees or political parties, which constitutes a serious breach of transparency and campaign finance regulations under Polish law.

The operational entity behind this campaign was Estratos Digital GmbH, which—according to commercial registry data—has been 80% owned since 2021 by U.S. investors affiliated with the Democratic Party and the Higher Ground Labs fund. This fund was created in response to Donald Trump’s 2016 election and aims to finance tech startups supporting Democratic candidates—indicating its clearly political nature. The remaining shares in Estratos are held by individuals from the circle of former Hungarian leftist Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, including Ádám Ficsor, former minister for secret services, who now manages Estratos. Through various entities registered in Austria and Estonia, the company provided digital services to numerous progressive NGOs in Poland. In reality, it gained access to user data, contacted NGOs to propose participation in campaigns, and provided advertising infrastructure aimed at shaping public opinion ahead of elections.

One company affiliated with Estratos was the Estonian Amplify App OÜ, which formally managed user data for the dolacz.org platform. After the campaign ended, both the website and the “Dołącz” profile disappeared from the internet. The financial report of the Estonian firm shows revenue of approximately PLN 1.6 million in 2023, most of which was spent on a Polish advertising campaign, despite neither Estratos nor Amplify having the status of an electoral committee. Moreover, company representatives Ewelina Kycia and Paulina Gruda contacted Polish NGOs, offering to involve them in promotional activities. Following the first media reports, both women deleted their LinkedIn profiles.

Journalistic investigations revealed that the 2023 campaign was closely linked to the 2025 presidential campaign, in which similar online profiles and ads were used. In both cases, nearly identical infrastructure was employed: profiles created via Wix, identical favicons, HTML code, the same DNS servers (Ali and Sid), and the same team members. The 2025 campaign featured the profiles “Wiesz jak nie jest” and “Stół Dorosłych,” which aired ads promoting Rafał Trzaskowski and attacking his opponents—Karol Nawrocki and Sławomir Mentzen. Some of these ads had previously appeared on the profiles of Civic Coalition politicians, including Adam Szłapka, Sławomir Nitras, and Cezary Tomczyk. Pre-first-round advertising expenditures approached half a million zlotys.

As in 2023, the funding sources for these ads were undisclosed. The ads did not originate from Trzaskowski’s campaign account and were instead produced and distributed by



Estratos-affiliated entities—The Public Agency (Armenia), the European Center for Digital Action, and the Lunda platform (used for data processing and payment handling). According to official Meta statements, page administrators were verified in Poland, but there was also a trace leading to the United Arab Emirates (with Meta temporarily listing a second administrator in that region—possibly due to VPN usage).

Organizations involved in these operations (e.g., Akcja Demokracja, Fundacja Impuls dla Młodych) claimed they were not formal campaign participants but merely offered “courtesy” or technical support to their longtime partner Estratos. However, members of Inicjatywa Wschód reported that Estratos representatives explicitly claimed to be the campaign’s initiators and that it was funded through a grant they had obtained.

The common denominator for both the 2023 and 2025 activities is an international network involving Estratos (Austria/Hungary), DatAdat OÜ (Estonia), Amplify App OÜ (Estonia), Higher Ground Labs (USA), The Public Agency (Armenia), and in Poland—numerous ideologically progressive NGOs. The same people, the same techniques (targeting, automated social media ads, influencer recruitment, hidden funding), the same narrative patterns (attacking the right, mobilizing left-wing voters), and the same organizational channels constitute a coherent and precisely managed operational network.

It is worth noting that the attempt to replicate this mechanism during the 2025 presidential election met greater resistance—thanks to social media users who exposed information about circumvention of campaign finance rules and journalistic investigations. For the first time in 2025, the structure of external influence—ideologically and financially tied to the U.S. Democratic Party—was detailed so thoroughly in Poland. In both 2023 and 2025, these activities disrupted electoral fairness, violated campaign finance transparency, and effectively manipulated the Polish electorate via social media. Although the ultimate impact is difficult to quantify, the scope, technical sophistication, and international connections make this one of the most serious challenges to the sovereignty of Poland’s democratic electoral process since 1989.

10. Paying the Price to Foreign Patrons

In the autumn of 2023, Brussels and Berlin achieved one of their strategic political objectives in Poland: the installation of a government in Warsaw aligned with the interests of eurocrats and the German political-business elite. This was not a standard democratic change of government, but the culmination of a multi-year campaign of political pressure, financial blackmail, and a media influence operation. The aim of this campaign was not to strengthen democracy in Poland, but to subjugate it—transforming it into a tool for implementing globalist goals by gaining full control over the decision-making centers of one of the EU’s largest member states.



According to Kinga Kollár, MEP from Péter Magyar's party, Brussels deliberately withheld EU funds due to Poland as a means to degrade citizens' living conditions and create fertile ground for a change in government in favor of forces loyal to the EU establishment. Poland became a testing ground for a new model of influence—one in which financial pressure serves as a lever for political transformation.

Brussels' key weapon was the strategy of "starving out" defiant governments. For nearly two years, Poland was denied its rightful share of the Recovery Fund, even though it had met most of the formal conditions. The true purpose of this action was not to enforce the rule of law but to instill a public sense of stagnation and frustration—regardless of the actual state of the economy. The objective was to trigger a shift in public sentiment, which eventually succeeded. Funds were withheld from Polish citizens to force them into voting for Tusk and his coalition partners, who—as later developments revealed—were prepared to pay any price to regain power.

Poland's experience shows that even after formally unfreezing EU funds, a government subordinate to the interests of Brussels and Berlin makes decisions detrimental to its own society. The political support of EU elites comes at a high cost: the erosion of national security, prosperity, and sovereignty. The bill for power granted by foreign centers must eventually be paid—at the expense of the national interest.

After the left-liberal coalition took power, the official narrative revolved around the "unblocking of EU funds" and a "return to the European family." Yet, contrary to citizens' expectations, these funds did not result in improved living conditions for ordinary people. Instead, they were largely allocated to projects favoring global corporations and initiatives endorsed by Berlin and Brussels. The government revived a narrative of submissiveness, equating integration with the surrender of national ambitions. The goal was not to meet social needs but to consolidate power and begin repaying the political debt owed to foreign patrons.

The claim of a "strong position" of domestic liberal politicians in the European establishment is a clear myth. Donald Tusk cultivated this image for years, leveraging gestures of support from Brussels elites—epitomized by his declaration that "no one outsmarts me in the EU," suggesting he could effectively advance Polish interests thanks to his stature. Reality, however, quickly dispelled this illusion: Tusk abandoned opposition to the migration pact, failed to halt disadvantageous trade agreements with Ukraine and Mercosur, and mere days after the 2025 presidential election—despite Trzaskowski's proclamation that the Green Deal was "dead"—had to accept new, even more stringent climate goals issued by the EU. A symbolic demonstration of Tusk's diminished role on the international stage was his trip to



Kyiv alongside the chancellor of Germany, the president of France, and the prime minister of the UK—in the second train car, not coincidentally.

Before the elections, Tusk was treated with ostentatious favor. After taking power—he was regarded in accordance with his actual status: as a puppet, an executor of foreign decisions. Such humiliating treatment should not be surprising—it is difficult to expect respect for a politician who acts not in the interest of his nation, but to serve foreign powers in pursuit of office.

The new globalist government began a systematic policy of diminishing Polish sovereignty—both in economic and strategic terms. The most symbolic and dramatic case was the freezing, and under public pressure partial reinstatement in a downgraded form, of the Central Communication Port (CPK) project.

From the outset, CPK had been openly criticized by Civic Platform. Notably, in an interview on TOK FM radio on May 30, 2018, Rafał Trzaskowski stated: "I think it's megalomania. Considering we'll have an airport in Berlin within two years, and the government claims that more planes will land at CPK than in Beijing, these are more of the Prime Minister's PowerPoint fantasies than anything grounded in reality."⁴⁸

The CPK project was a strategic infrastructure initiative designed to position Poland as a key transport hub in Central and Eastern Europe, integrating air, high-speed rail, and road transport. It was also meant to play a vital military role as a NATO logistics base for moving troops and equipment to the eastern flank. By 2023, under the United Right government, over 1,000 hectares of land had been acquired, a master plan had been developed, environmental decisions issued, the terminal contractor (Foster + Partners) selected, and preparations for rail investments (CPK "spokes") had begun.

Following the change in government, the project was frozen, subjected to audits, and targeted by a disinformation campaign. The management board was dismissed, tenders halted, and the project practically discontinued in its original form. Even though over 60% of Poles expressed support for the CPK (e.g., IBRiS poll, 2023), the government announced its "unblocking" in a reduced and delayed version, stripping it of the full cargo and rail infrastructure components. This weakened Poland's position as a logistics hub and preserved the dominance of German airports—particularly Frankfurt—which had long seen CPK as a competitive threat. These actions served Berlin's interests at the expense of Poland's transport and military sovereignty.

⁴⁸ <https://audycje.tokfm.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Another controversial move by Tusk's government was the abandonment of the plan to modernize and make the Polish section of the Oder River navigable, part of a broader vision for inland navigation development in Central Europe.

The Oder modernization within the E30 route (Danube–Oder–Elbe) was pursued by the United Right government to establish Poland as a regional logistics hub. It envisioned linking the Szczecin–Świnoujście ports with Central and Southern Europe, creating an independent transport route that could rival German inland ports.

From the beginning, the project faced coordinated opposition from environmental groups—both Polish and German—claiming threats to Natura 2000 ecosystems and fish spawning grounds. In March 2021, these groups submitted a joint appeal to the European Commission to block Polish investments on the Oder⁴⁹.

Simultaneously, German states, particularly Brandenburg, launched legal actions against Poland, reporting the case to the Commission and alleging breaches of EU environmental law. As a result, in May 2022, the Commission announced the exclusion of the Oder from the TEN-T network, citing ecological non-compliance and subpar navigational parameters⁵⁰.

The organizational and media pressure was supported by left-liberal Polish press outlets, which criticized hydrotechnical projects as "ecologically devastating" and "contrary to European values," ignoring similar German initiatives. The Oder dispute also became a case study in judicial activism, with administrative court rulings based on questionable legal interpretations—clearly against the interests of the Republic of Poland. These decisions, made without regard to strategic national priorities, effectively blocked the project.

After taking power in 2023, the Tusk government effectively dismantled the project. Hydrotechnical work was halted, tenders annulled, and references to the E30 waterway vision disappeared from government programs. The justification was the need to comply with EC requirements and environmental concerns, with a total abandonment of the fight for national transport interests and infrastructural sovereignty.

As a result, inland navigation development in Poland was permanently stifled, and Germany's dominance in the Central European port-logistics sector was reinforced. Instead of building an independent transport system, Poland became a peripheral executor of the EU's environmental policy—at the cost of its own competitiveness and economic security. This means maintaining dependency on western trade routes and forfeiting sovereignty in modern waterborne logistics.

⁴⁹ <https://odpowiedzialny-inwestor.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁵⁰ <https://oko.press/odra-niemcy-pozywaja-polske> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



Another striking example of the Tusk government's subservience to Western—especially German and French—interests was the cancellation of the purchase of S-70i Black Hawk helicopters produced in the PZL Mielec plant owned by Lockheed Martin. General Wiesław Kukuła explained during a press conference that the government "decided to reprioritize helicopter programs" to "better address future battlefield challenges."⁵¹ This vague declaration was made despite months of preparation, strong military interest, and the fact that production occurs in Poland—offering significant support to domestic defense manufacturing.

The decision was condemned by commentators and former officials, including former Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak, who called it a "scandalous decision" jeopardizing 1,600 jobs in Mielec, weakening military interoperability, and stalling the modernization of the helicopter fleet⁵². Moreover, these helicopters were among the few advanced systems partially produced in Poland, giving the decision not only a military but also an economic dimension—as a blow to the national defense industry. In a time of war risk and regional instability, such decisions must also be seen as extremely irresponsible from a national security perspective.

A broader pattern is emerging in government defense procurement: even when it doesn't formally cancel contracts, the Tusk administration systematically delays implementation and introduces vague procedures for "reassessing needs" or "securing investment land," effectively suspending key deals. This applies to contracts with both the U.S. (e.g., HIMARS systems, AH-64 Apache helicopters) and South Korea (K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, FA-50 aircraft). Despite media declarations of continued cooperation, many critical military orders remain stalled—without clear timelines and with the risk of long delays. Instead of concrete decisions, the government announces audits, "strategic reviews," or claims that purchases "must be preceded by a comprehensive site-use analysis." In practice, this means indefinite postponements without transparent criteria or genuine action. This not only creates uncertainty among Poland's current partners but also lays the groundwork for shifting procurement toward European—especially Franco-German—options.

From a national security and defense industry perspective, these actions undermine Poland's position as an independent NATO actor and strategic partner, deepen dependence on EU structures, and strengthen Berlin and Paris's influence in the defense sector—at the expense of proven suppliers from the U.S. and South Korea.

In conclusion, Poland's post-2023 experience shows that for globalist elites, the well-being of citizens is secondary to the durability of their power and loyalty to foreign centers. Power

⁵¹ <https://www.reuters.com> (accessed: 15 July 2025).

⁵² <https://wpolityce.pl> (accessed: 15 July 2025).



gained through externally assisted political operations becomes a tool for repaying obligations—at the citizens' expense. Even the formal unblocking of funds does not bring real social benefits, as the true goal is not improved living standards but the redirection of Poland toward political, economic, and cultural dependence on Western European power centers.

Under the externally imposed rule of globalists, Poland becomes a laboratory for a new form of colonialism—soft, institutional, cloaked in the language of values, yet resulting in real loss of agency. A government serving foreign interests cannot represent the nation—it can only administer it within a broader system.

The globalist model of power in Poland thus relies not only on the brute takeover of the state but also on a more or less subtle exchange of loyalty: domestic elites receive international legitimacy, media support, and financial backing in return for surrendering sovereignty and loyalty to their own citizens. Poland after 2023 is a sobering example of how costly such a transaction can be—something Poles began to realize within just a few months of Tusk's rule.