CAN THE VISEGRAD COOPERATION FUNCTION INDEPENDENTLY OF POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOUR MEMBER STATES?

The Visegrad prime ministers’ summit held in Budapest on 23 June 2026, concluding the Hungarian V4 Presidency of 2025–2026, has once again raised the question of whether the Visegrad Cooperation rests on foundations that extend beyond the current political relations among the participating states. The V4 is not a political bloc characterised by a constant level of political alignment. Rather, it is a flexible coordination platform whose intensity varies over time. Although its functioning is influenced by the political cycles shaping the governments of the member states and by the state of bilateral relations, its continued existence and operational capacity are supported by factors that are largely independent of day-to-day politics. These factors include geographical compactness, economic interconnectedness, the growing volume of intra-regional trade, a shared historical experience on the eastern frontier of Western civilisation, institutionalised cultural and scientific ties, particularly through the International Visegrad Fund, and the fact that the countries of the region are exposed in similar ways to the consequences of great-power competition. These conditions periodically create practical incentives for cooperation, particularly in the fields of security and agriculture. 

The weakness resulting from the V4’s limited institutionalisation is also one of its strengths. While cooperation may become less intensive during certain periods, the absence of rigid structures prevents political conflicts from tearing the format apart. The V4 can therefore only be properly understood if it is not expected to function as a permanent political alliance. Instead, attention should be directed toward identifying the areas in which it remains capable of active cooperation regardless of the current political climate.